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A major figure in radical philosophy in Germany in the 1840’s, Ludwig 
Feuerbach evoked generally respectful comment from Kierkegaard. Although 
the humanistic and naturalistic analysis of religion and Christianity on which 
his reputation is chiefly founded stands in stark contrast to the theism of 
Kierkegaard, there also exist striking parallels in their thought and existential 
concerns. Feuerbach is unfortunately often identified with a naive materialism 
and anti-religious position which he expressly repudiated. In actuality he is 
a naturalist in philosophy, an insightful interpreter of religion, and an un­
flagging proponent of religious humanism. No less important, in Kierke­
gaard’s ey&s, he is a sworn enemy of the religious hypocrisy of nominal 
Christians. [Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx (London, 1936), Chaps. VII, 
VIII; Eugene Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach (London, 
1970); Karl Barth, Die Theologie und die Kirche (Munich, 1928), Chap. VII.] 
The radical naturalistic critique of Christianity which aborted his hopes 
for university appointments also brought Feuerbach some enthusiastic re­
cognition. Shortly after the publication in 1841 of his major work, Das 
Wesen des Christenthums, his most famous disciple, Karl Marx, proclaimed 
him to be the only way to truth and light. Years later, Friedrich Nietzsche 
reflected on the fact that a great many -  including his own one-time friend 
Wagner -  had once welcomed Feuerbach’s thought as a new gospel. [Karl 
Marx, “Luther als Schiedsrichter zwischen Strauss und Feuerbach” in Arnold 
Rüge, Anecdota zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publicistik (Zürich 
und Winterthur, 1843), Part II, p. 208; Friedrich Nietzsche, Gesammelte 
Werke (Musarionausgabe, Leipzig und München, 1920-29, XI, p. 374.] 
Although the wave of popularity which Feuerbach enjoyed relatively short 
lived, his Das Wesen des Christenthums quickly went through two succeeding 
editions after its publication in 1841, and it was translated into English in 
1854. Kierkegaard purchased several of Feuerbach’s books, including, in 1844,
a copy of the second edition of Das Wesen des Christenthums and of Arnold 
Ruge’s Anecdota containing Feuerbach’s important “Vorläufige Thesen zur 
Reformation der Philosophie” with responses to the latter’s work by Ruge and 
Marx. [See H. P. Rohde, The Auctioneer's Sales Record of the Library of 
Søren Kierkegaard (Copenhagen, 1967)] Although disapproving of Feuer­
bach’s antagonism to Christianity itself, Kierkegaard recognized similarities 
in their thought. In fact he expressed some concern lest he himself be 
identified with freethinkers like Feuerbach. In his fairly numerous if brief 
written references to Feuerbach, he portrays him as a clear expositor of 
Christian faith, a formidable critic of modern orthodoxy, and an unintentional 
but useful personal ally. [Kierkegaard sometimes refers to Feuerbach as “the 
freethinker”, and occasionally he links his name with those of D. Strauss, 
B. Bauer and others. [SV VII, 605; XII, 154-55; XIII, 441; XIV, 42.]
Like Kierkegaard, Feuerbach finds Christianity related essentially to human 
emotional life and in fundamental tension with reason. Unlike him, he 
provides a naturalistic explanation of these facts and of religion in general, 
contending that gods are mythological products of man’s need, beings whose 
contradictory nature and essential impossibility testify to their fully human 
origin and function. Thus, the human qualities of Christ -  whose paradoxical 
nature Feuerbach and Kierkegaard equally strongly emphasize -  are needed 
to make a supposedly transcendent god humanly relevant. By simultaneously 
infinitizing these, men find solace for their natural liminations and support 
for their quite human values. [Wesen, 2nd ed., Chaps. II, XVI, XXIII, 
Appendix, pp. 510-22.] In an account which bears marked resemblances to 
that of Kierkegaard, Feuerbach delineates the existential significance of 
Christianity -  its requiremenet of suffering love and the manner in which 
the life of reason and morality may be compromised or otherwise altered 
through devotion to a deity transcending both. It is in their responses to this 
analysis that the two thinkers most clearly diverge. Kierkegaard’s faith enables 
him to question the claims of reason and morality. For Feuerbach, such a 
paradoxical faith subverts reason and natural self-interest and self-respect and 
should be replaced by a committment to mankind itself. [Wesen, Chaps. II, 
V, XXVII, XXVIII, Appendix, pp. 459-64, 488-510.]
Kierkegaard is clearly cognizant of the general character of Feuerbach’s 
position. He remarks that the freethinkers are less muddled in interpreting 
Christianity, than its orthodox defenders, and that they are at least honest in
calling it myth and poetry, while the latter betray their own scepticism in 
their lives. [Pap. XI1 A 70; X5 A 62; SV VII, 571-72, 585-86; XIV 117.] 
He acknowledges that Feuerbach is enlightening in his criticism, that he is a 
clever and consistent thinker, and that he can serve for Christians as a 
purifying fire. [Pap. V B 1,10. As noted above, Kierkegaard purchased Ruge’s 
Anecdota in 1844, and his reference to Feuerbach as an “lid Bcek” probably 
reflects his having read Marx’s tribute to the “Feuer-bach”. (Part II, p. 208.)] 
Nevertheless, despite such positive recognition and some occasionally remark­
able parallels in their thought, Kierkegaard has remarkably little to say about 
the central themes of Das Wesen des Christenthums. He never engages in a 
critique of Feuerbach’s naturalistic hypothesis regarding Christianity or 
religion, and the claim that one may find in Kierkegaard (as in Marx, 
Nietzsche and Freud) “evidence of the fertility and importance of Feuerbach’s 
ideas” seems dubious. [Kamenka, p. viii.]
It is to an issue somewhat peripheral to Feuerbach’s analysis that Kierke­
gaard chiefly devotes his attention -  the contrast between the rationalized, 
self-indulgent and falsified religion of contemporary Christendom and the 
faith and suffering devotion of previous generations. Although the original 
faith is itself largely an unfortunate delusion for Feuerbach, he finds its 
contemporary corruption uniquely distasteful, and he speaks of it in words 
reminiscent of those of Kierkegaard. Whereas a dying to the world is essential 
for genuine Christianity, “solche Freiheit, solche Wahrheit widerspricht nun 
freilich dem heutigen Christenthum . . . , ” a religion “höchst praktisch und
weltklug__ Doch wende mich mit Ekel und Verachtung weg von dem
modernen Christenthum, wo die Braut Christi bereitwillig selbst der Poly­
gamie huldigt . . .  aber doch zugleich -  O schändliche Heuchlerei! auf die
ewige .. .  heilige Wahrheit des Wortes Gottes schwört__ Wie anders die
alten Christen! .. .  Und jetzt leben wir im Zeitalter der Versöhnung! Ja 
wohl!” [Wesen, 243-44.]
For Kierkegaard, for whom mere playing at Christianity is more spiritually 
dangerous than heresy or schism, and for whom hypocrisy is anathema, this 
exposé by Feuerbach came as welcome support from an unexpected quarter. 
[SV VI, 483; Pap. V B 148,37; X2 163 (p. 129); XI1 A 70; XI2 A 267-68; 
Wesen, Chap. VI, Appendix 424 fn., 437-39.] Kierkegaard is not completely 
satisfied with Feuerbach’s portrayal of the harshness of Christian faith; in 
fact he senses in it a deliberate distortion. Nevertheless -  as with his own
account -  he sees this portrayal functioning as a useful corrective to an even 
greater distortion. Whatever its faults, he sees it as more accurate than that 
of the “so-called Christian Church.,, It has come to the place, he suggests, that 
one must learn from freethinkers about faith. [SV VIII, 605; Pap. XI1 A 559.] 
Considering the fact that Feuerbach attacks not only a degenerate and 
corrupt Christendom but the essence of Christian faith itself, the tone of 
Kierkegaard’s comments is remarkably positive. Only rarely does he point to 
what he perceives as errors in the thought of Feuerbach or of other free­
thinkers, and then to matters essentially unrelated to the central naturalistic 
critique of Christianity or religion. [SV II, 286-87; Pap. V A 14; XI1 A 333.] 
Occasionally he criticizes Feuerbach for a certain malignancy of motive, and 
in one case he attributes his rejection of Christianity to personal weakness, an 
inability to meet the very requirements of faith which Kierkegaard credited 
him with so well understanding. [Pap. X2 A 163 (p. 128); XI1 A 559.] In 
another instance he groups Feuerbach with Adler as differing manifestations 
of a common malaise -  obstinate repudiation of authority. In the case of 
Adler this showed itself in a claim to spiritual authority for himself, in that 
of Feuerbach in an attempt to overthrow legitimate authority. In general, 
however, Kierkegaard reacts in a remarkably mild manner to Feuerbach’s 
work and person. He identifies the latter’s rejection of faith as both less 
confused and less dangerous than the claims of Adler, and he clearly and 
consistently finds hypocrisy a greater spiritual threat than honest doubt. [Pap. 
VIII 2 B 19 (p. 72), B 27 (pp. 77-78); SV IV, 452.]
Most evident in Kierkegaard’s generally respectful treatment of Feuerbach 
is his recognition of the latter’s usefulness to the cause of faith. [SV VI, 475.] 
While acknowledging that Feuerbach is a skilled enemy and even a “malicious 
demon”, Kierkegaard repeatedly observes that he may nevertheless serve as 
a useful ally. He is what the hypocritical and demoralized age requires, one 
who can play a role in the cause of truth -  perhaps even suffering persecution 
for it -  in a manner not unlike that of Kierkegaard himself. [Pap. V B 9, 
B 74,5; X2 A 163; XI2 A 119, A 267.]
